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RHETORIC OR REALITY: THE IMPACT OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON FEDERAL
AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Zane 0. Gresham, Esq.*
Thomas A. Bloomfield, Esq.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Maintaining the ability to adopt and enforce stringent
food, health and environmental protection measures was a
critical issue for the United States [hereinafter "U.S."] in the
Uruguay Round negotiations. Those negotiations resulted in
the signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement [hereinafter
"URA"] and the establishment of the World Trade Organiza-
tion [hereinafter "WTO"]. 1
Desiring a greener trade agreement, environmental or-
ganizations opposed congressional approval of the URA. In
opposing the agreement, these groups argued before the U.S.
Congress that the URA would put U.S. food, safety and envi-
ronmental measures in "serious jeopardy" and that "[the
agreement] raised serious concerns about the continued abil-
ity of the U.S. to protect its citizens and the environment."
2
* Mr. Gresham is a partner with Morrison & Foerster, where he co-di-
rects the firm's worldwide Land Use and Environmental Law Group and is a
senior member of the Latin American Practice Group.
** Mr. Bloomfield is an associate with Morrison & Foerster practicing in
the firm's Land Use and Environmental Law Group. Both Mr. Gresham and
Mr. Bloomfield are resident in the firm's San Francisco office.
1. The URA represents the most comprehensive trade agreement in his-
tory. It will liberalize trade in industrial goods, textiles and agricultural prod-
ucts; elaborate rules on subsidies and dumping; establish a framework for liber-
alizing trade in services; and create a system to address intellectual property in
foreign investment. The WTO will oversee the URA and resolve disputes. Fi-
nally, the URA will convene a working group on trade and environmental issues
to address environmental issues that arose during the negotiation of the Uru-
guay Round. For a further discussion of the URA, see R. Steinberg, The Uru-
guay Round: A Preliminary Analysis of the Final Act (1994) (unpublished arti-
cle, on file with the law firm of Morrison & Foerster).
2. Hearings on the Final Agreement of the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Rob-
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In fact, environmental organizations claimed that the URA
would empower the WTO to dictate what U.S. citizens should
be afraid of and what the U.S. would be permitted to do "to
ameliorate those fears."3 To further provoke opposition, envi-
ronmental organizations united with Jesse Helms and others
in claiming that U.S. sovereignty was being ceded to some
powerful international trade bureaucracy.
A more sober analysis of the actual text of the agreement
reveals that these doomsday predictions are unjustified-the
sky is not falling on the U.S. environmental regulatory re-
gime or on U.S. sovereignty. In fact, even legislators who are
widely held out by environmentalists as friends of the envi-
ronment, such as Senator Barbara Boxer and Representative
Jim Bachhus, supported, and continue to support, the
agreement.
4
The key components of the URA relating to public health,
safety and environmental regulations are: (1) the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures5 ; (2) the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade6; and (3) the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes'.
This paper examines the likely impact of these agree-
ments on U.S. and California food safety and environmental
regulations, as well as an area not expressly addressed by the
URA-use of trade measures to further environmental
objectives.
ert Houseman of the Center for Intl Environmental Law on Behalf of the Si-
erra Club).
3. Id.
4. In supporting the URA, Senator Boxer stated: "I have looked closely at
the concerns about our environmental, health and safety laws. I understand
these concerns. But I am confident that our laws can and will be protected."
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 14, 1994, at 19.
5. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (S &
P Agreement), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
6. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Trade Barriers (TBT Agreement),
33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
7. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
[Vol. 351144
NAFTA-GATT SYMPOSIUM
II. THE S & P AGREEMENT
The S & P Agreement addresses health and safety stan-
dards, which are referred to as sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.8 Members of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") all agree on the right of governments to
take action to adopt health and safety regulations even if
those measures restrict trade. While the URA encourages
harmonization of standards where an international standard
provides the level of protection a government deems appro-
priate,9 the primary concern of the S & P Agreement is how
to differentiate between legitimate food safety regulations
and measures intended to be disguised protectionist devices.
Directly discerning the "intent" of a government is a diffi-
cult task. Therefore, the S & P Agreement sets forth several
basic criteria aimed at distinguishing between measures in-
tended to regulate food safety and those intended as trade
protectionist devices. For example, the S & P Agreement re-
quires that S & P measures "are not applied in a manner
which would constitute ... a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade" and that S & P measures have a basis in
science. 10
While S & P measures must meet basic criteria designed
to avoid phony health and safety measures, the S & P Agree-
8. The S & P Agreement, Annex A(1) defines "sanitary and phytosanitary
measures" as:
Any measure applied:
- to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of
pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing
organisms;
- to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or dis-
ease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuff;
- to human life or health within the territory of the Member from the
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products
thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
- to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, de-
crees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia,
end product criteria; processes and production methods ... sampling
procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and label-
ing requirements directly related to food safety.
S & P Agreement, supra note 5, annex A(1).
9. See discussion infra part I.C.
10. See, e.g., S & P Agreement, supra note 5, Preamble, art. 6.
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ment explicitly leaves to individual governments the policy
question as to how much risk is appropriate. In the preamble
to the S & P Agreement, the Members of the WTO acknowl-
edge that they do not wish to "requir[e] Members to change
their appropriate level of protection of human, animal or
plant life or health."1
Similarly, Article 11 of the S & P Agreement recognizes
the right of governments "to introduce or maintain [S & P]
measures which result in a higher level of [S & P] protection
than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant
international standards... as a consequence of the level of [S
& P] protection a Member determines to be appropriate
.... "12 Article 5 expressly addresses some of the factors a
member shall consider in establishing the appropriate level
of protection. These provisions establish that the S & P
Agreement leaves to individual governments the political de-
cision regarding what level of risk is appropriate.
13
Critics contend that the S & P Agreement will restrict
the ability of the U.S. to establish and enforce stringent food
safety standards. Specifically, critics claim that the S & P
Agreement will:
" allow international trade experts to second-guess U.S.
judgment regarding the health and safety concerns
posed by a chemical, product or process.
" require the U.S. to "harmonize" its food safety stan-
dards by adopting international food standards that are
less strict than current U.S. standards.
" prevent the U.S. from rejecting food imports that it does
not consider safe; and
" prohibit or restrict a state from enforcing stricter food
safety standards than those of the federal government.
These are serious charges. However, these concerns
were critical to the U.S. throughout the negotiation process,
and a careful reading of the S & P Agreement makes it clear
11. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, Preamble; see also Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1144 (1994).
12. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11.
13. These provisions are an important improvement compared to the previ-
ous GATT regime, which did not expressly acknowledge the right of govern-
ments to select the level of protection they deem appropriate.
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that the final text adequately addresses each of these
concerns.
A. Use of Scientific Principles
Article 6 of the S & P Agreement directs members to base
their S & P measures on science:
Members shall insure that any sanitary or phytosani-
tary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on
scientific principles and is not maintained without suffi-
cient scientific evidence, except as provided for in para-
graph 7 of Article 5 [relating to interim measures].' 4
Critics assert that Article 6 would enable trade panels "to
second-guess the scientific basis for domestic safety stan-
dards" and "prevent countries from acting on suspected food
hazards until there is conclusive scientific proof."15 Critics
also argue that the science requirement will impair the right
of governments to adopt measures to avoid harms with ex-
tremely low, or zero, health or safety risk.1"
The concern over requiring measures to be based on sci-
ence is unjustified. First, Article 6 applies only to the method
of avoiding risk, for example, whether there is a scientific ba-
sis to support the determination that harm exists. Article 6
does not prevent a government from determining the appro-
priate level of risk, including zero risk. 17
Second, Article 6 only requires that a measure be "based
on scientific principles" and that a measure not be main-
tained "without sufficient scientific evidence." 8 These stan-
dards do not require that a measure be based on the "best"
science and do not authorize a panel to determine the
"weight" of the scientific evidence" in evaluating a specific
provision. Rather, the test acknowledges that scientific cer-
tainty is rare, and requires a political judgment regarding
uncertainty and risk. That determination is reserved to indi-
vidual governments. Moreover, in interpreting the scope of
14. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 6 (emphasis added).
15. Patti Goldman, Cost of Commerce, THE RECORDER, June 23, 1994, at 4.
See also Hearings on the Uruguay Round Agreement Under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade before the Senate Commerce Comm., 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) (Statement of Lori Wallach, Staff Attorney Public Citizen).
16. Goldman, supra note 15, at 4.
17. See S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 16.
18. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 6.
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this provision, it is important to remember the purpose of the
science requirement-to ferret out disguised protectionist
devices.
Third, concern over Article 6 is unjustified because Arti-
cle 6 does not impose restrictions on U.S. regulations that do
not already exist. The Administrative Procedures Act al-
ready subjects U.S. regulations to scientific review under an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. The standard applied by
a panel under Article 6 will be at least equally deferential
because the panel is not intended to be a judge of the regula-
tion, but is only intended to discern whether the measure is a
trade barrier. Further, while U.S. courts generally give some
deference to regulatory agencies, 19 the S & P Agreement
gives a government complete deference in selecting the ap-
propriate level of risk and authorizes a government to adopt a
measure based upon incomplete evidence. 20 These S & P pro-
visions indicate that substantial deference will be given to S
& P measures by trade panels. Moreover, since only WTO
members may bring challenges to U.S. regulations under the
URA, it is less likely that regulations will be challenged
under the S & P Agreement than under the Administrative
Procedures Act.
B. Use of Risk Assessment
Article 16 of the S & P Agreement provides that meas-
ures shall be based "on an assessment, as appropriate to the
circumstances, of risks to human, animal or plant life or
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques devel-
oped by international organizations." 21 As with Article 6, Ar-
ticle 16 is intended to ensure that a government does not
adopt a measure for the purpose of protecting a domestic
industry.
Critics contend that the risk assessment provision will
make food safety measures with extremely low-risk or zero-
risk levels illegal under GATT, in part because such low
levels may not be justified using a reasonable cost-benefit
risk analysis and because science may not justify such low-
risk levels.
19. See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 836 (1984).
20. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 18, 19. See discussion, infra part
1.B.
21. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 16.
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This criticism ignores the distinction between a govern-
ment's right to select the appropriate risk level and the S & P
measure adopted to implement that level. For example, an
oft cited example of a U.S. law that could be challenged under
the S & P Agreement is the Delaney Clause, which requires
that processed foods contain no residue of cancer-causing ad-
ditives. Even though many scientists may argue that trace
amounts of such chemicals pose very little risk, the political
decision to adopt a zero-risk tolerance is not subject to chal-
lenge under the S & P Agreement. While the S & P Agree-
ment directs governments to take into account risk assess-
ment techniques developed by international organizations,
the agreement does not prohibit governments from consider-
ing any other factors or methods they deem appropriate.
The same analysis would appear to protect California
Proposition 6522 from challenge. Proposition 65 requires that
businesses that expose consumers to listed substances pro-
vide an effective warning. Because a chemical is only listed
by California as subject to Proposition 65 after California de-
termines there is a reasonable basis for concluding the chemi-
cal causes cancer or reproductive harm, the statute would
comply with the science requirement. And because the chem-
ical is listed based upon an assessment of risk, the statute
would comply with the risk assessment requirement. More-
over, there is nothing to indicate that Proposition 65 was
adopted to protect domestic industry.
Where scientific evidence is insufficient to objectively as-
sess risk, the S & P Agreement provides that a government
may adopt a provisional standard, to be revised within a rea-
sonable time frame.23 This provision could be used for cut-
ting-edge regulations where there is not yet any information
regarding the existence of the perceived risk. An example of
such cutting-edge regulations would be food irradiation
regulations.
Thus, the S & P Agreement clearly does not prohibit gov-
ernments from selecting the risk level they deem appropriate
22. The S & P Agreement does not require states to use the same standards
as the federal government, so that states are free to adopt standards as long as
those standards are not inconsistent with the S & P Agreement (or other provi-
sions of the URA).
23. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 22 ("[iln cases where relevant scien-
tific evidence is insufficient, a member may provisionally adopt [S & P] meas-
ures on the basis of available pertinent information ....").
11491995]
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and, even in the face of insufficient evidence of harm, permits
governments to adopt S & P measures. Because regulations
in the U.S. are based upon a political choice of what level of
risk is appropriate and a scientific determination regarding
whether the risk exists, U.S. food and sanitary standards
should not be negatively impacted. In fact, to the extent that
the S & P Agreement causes governments to evaluate risks
on a rational basis, evaluating the science, the cost and the
actual impacts of the proposed measure, the S & P Agree-
ment could have a positive impact on U.S. and California
regulations.
C. International Standards
Critics contend that the S & P Agreement will require
the U.S. to relax its food and safety standards in order to be
consistent with less stringent international standards, even
where the U.S. deems the risks posed by those international
standards to be unacceptable. Article 3 provides in relevant
part:
To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as
wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sani-
tary or phytosanitary measures on international stan-
dards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist,
except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in
particular in paragraph 3.... Members may introduce or
maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which re-
sult in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protec-
tion than would be achieved by measures based on the rel-
evant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as
a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary pro-
tection a Member determines to be appropriate in accord-
ance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through
8 of Article 5.n.2.2a
The S & P Agreement could not be more clear: even
though it encourages harmonization with international stan-
dards, each government retains the right to use a more strin-
gent standard if it deems the international standard inade-
quate. First, a government may impose a measure that is
more stringent than an international standard "if there is sci-
24. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 6 (emphasis supplied).
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entific justification."2 5 The S & P Agreement provides that
"scientific justification" exists if a government concludes that
the international standard is "not sufficient to achieve its ap-
propriate level of ... protection" based on "an examination
and evaluation of available scientific information in conform-
ity with the relevant provision of this Agreement."
26
Second, the S & P Agreement authorizes standards that
are more stringent than international standards where "the
measure is adopted as a consequence of the level of... protec-
tion a [government] determines to be appropriate."
27
Third, the preamble confirms the desire of the WTO
members to promote the use of international standards
"without requiring members to change their appropriate pro-
tection of human, animal or plant life or health."
28
Lastly, while a limited number of international stan-
dards are less stringent than their U.S. counterparts,2 9 the
U.S. is an active participant in the international standard-
setting organizations. Because those organizations make de-
cisions by consensus, the U.S. will have authority to veto any
standard it deems unacceptable. Moreover, the chief stan-
dard-setting organization for S & P measures, Codex Ali-
mentarius, has increased the transparency of its standard-
setting process. For example, it now allows participation by
non-governmental organizations, and most of its meetings
are open to the general public and the press. Therefore, fu-
ture standards are likely to be more stringent.
D. Trade-Restriction Test
The S & P Agreement provides that a government "shall
ensure that [S & P1 measures are not more trade restrictive
than required to achieve their appropriate level of ... protec-
25. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.
26. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11, n.2.
For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justifi-
cation if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available
scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international stan-
dards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
27. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11.
28. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, Preamble.
29. For substances in the U.S., approximately 85% of international stan-
dards used are more stringent than or equivalent to their U.S. counterparts.
11511995]
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tion."3 0 A measure will not be considered more trade-restric-
tive than required "unless there is another measure, reason-
ably available, taking into account technical and economic
feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of... protec-
tion and is significantly less restrictive to trade."31
Critics of the S & P Agreement claim that U.S. S & P
measures would be vulnerable under this test because a trade
panel could determine that hypothetical measures exist that
are less restrictive to trade. For example, taxes are often less
trade-restrictive than bans, and voluntary labeling is less re-
strictive than mandatory labeling. Environmental groups
also argue that the S & P Agreement precludes a panel from
considering political feasibility in determining whether a
measure is "reasonably available."
Except in rare cases, U.S. regulations will not be success-
fully challenged under this multi-level test. First, the other
measure must be reasonably available and not merely a hy-
pothetical possibility. While environmental groups argue
that a panel would be precluded from considering political
feasibility in determining whether a measure is reasonably
available, the S & P Agreement is silent on that issue. More-
over, in many cases, economic feasibility is integrally related
to political feasibility. Thus, political feasibility could be con-
sidered in determining whether a measure is reasonably
available.
Even if another measure may be reasonably available,
that measure must be both significantly less restrictive to
trade and provide the same level of protection. The S & P
Agreement therefore places a high standard on governments
seeking to challenge another government's S & P measure.
The recent GATT panel decision on the U.S. Corporate
Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE") also indicates that a mea-
sure will not be subject to challenge simply because a hypo-
thetically more economically efficient alternative is available.
In that dispute, the European Union challenged the U.S.
CAFE standards in part based upon a claim that use of a fuel
tax could more effectively encourage fuel efficiency. The
GATT panel indicated that, as long as the purpose of the
standard is legitimate, a measure would not be held invalid
simply because a more efficient measure that may be less re-
30. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5(6).
31. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5(6) n.3 (emphasis added).
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strictive is available. While the panel decision involved an
analysis of GATT Article XX(g), the panel decision indicates
that panels will not second-guess policy implementation deci-
sions by governments as long as those decisions are not dis-
guised barriers to trade.
E. Consistency in Levels of Protection
Article 5(5) of the S & P Agreement provides:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the applica-
tion of the concept of appropriate level of [S & P] protec-
tion ... each member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in the levels [of protection] it considers to be
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions re-
sult in discrimination or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade.
3 2
Environmental groups contend that this provision re-
quires a government to adopt risk levels that are consistent
for all situations, but that in many instances the U.S. risk
levels are not consistent. For example, the U.S. imposes a
zero-risk standard for carcinogenic pesticide residue in
processed food, compared to a one-in-a-million cancer risk for
most unprocessed foods. Different states also impose differ-
ent risk levels for similar situations. These inconsistent
levels, the argument goes, will subject U.S. laws to challenge.
This interpretation misses the mark. First, the S & P
Agreement does not require consistency of risk levels, but
simply sets consistency as one goal for such measures. Sec-
ondly, the express purpose of Article 5(5) is to avoid risk
levels being adopted for the purpose of protecting domestic
businesses. The S & P Agreement only requires governments
to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions if they result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade. Differences in protection levels resulting from other
reasons, such as federalism or a policy decision by an agency
to apply different levels in different risk circumstances,
would not be a basis for challenge. Thus, U.S. regulations
would not be subject to challenge simply because different
levels of risk are utilized in different situations.
32. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5(5).
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F. Equivalence of Foreign Standards
Pointing to Article 4(1), critics contend that the S & P
Agreement will impair the ability of the U.S. to apply its own
standards to imported foods.
Article 4(1) provides:
Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary meas-
ures of other Members as equivalent, even if these meas-
ures differ from their own or from those used by other
Members trading in the same product, if the exporting
Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Mem-
ber that its measures achieve the importing Member's ap-
propriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
For this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon
request, to the importing Member for inspection, testing
and other relevant procedures.33
While this provision does encourage governments to ac-
cept S & P measures of other countries when the standard is
equivalent, the U.S. retains the right to reject food imports
that do not meet U.S. food safety standards. As discussed
above, the U.S. may choose the level of risk it believes is
appropriate.
G. Impact on State and Local S & P Measures
The analysis of the impact of the S & P Agreement on
state and local regulations does not differ from the analysis
outlined above. Nothing in the S & P Agreement or other pro-
visions of the URA restricts the authority of state or local gov-
ernments to adopt measures that are more stringent than
those of the federal government. Thus, claims that the WTO
will cause state laws that are more stringent than their fed-
eral counterparts to be deemed illegal under GATT are sim-
ply not true.
Some critics contend that the S & P Agreement will im-
pair the ability of state and local governments to adopt S & P
measures because local governments do not have the re-
sources available to conduct risk assessments or to base
measures on science.
As discussed above, the requirements imposed by the
URA are minimal. The science requirement is not stringent.
Governments are free to select the level of risk they deem ap-
33. S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4(1).
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propriate. Where there is insufficient scientific evidence, gov-
ernments may adopt a provisional measure. Moreover, state
and local regulatory decisions are already subject to judicial
review under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. There-
fore, the requirements of the URA should not impose any ad-
ditional burdens. If a measure, however, was adopted as a
disguised barrier to trade with the intent of protecting a state
or local industry, then the measure may properly be subject
to challenge under the S & P Agreement.
III. AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
The TBT Agreement addresses product standards, tech-
nical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures.
Consistent with other provisions of the URA, the TBT Agree-
ment is designed to distinguish between technical require-
ments that are meant to achieve legitimate objectives and
those that are disguised trade barriers. For the most part,
the substantial provisions of the TBT Agreement have been
in place since 1980, although several provisions were recently
added to ensure a government's right to adopt environmental
and health measures.
In many ways, the TBT Agreement is more limited than
the S & P Agreement. For example, the TBT Agreement does
not impose a requirement that technical measures be scien-
tifically based. Moreover, many environmental laws are not
subject to the TBT Agreement because it applies only to
"technical regulations."34 The TBT Agreement defines "tech-
nical regulation" as one that "lays down product characteris-
tics."3 5 A technical regulation "may also include or deal ex-
clusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or
production method."36 This definition shows clearly that only
regulations impacting product characteristics are covered by
the TBT Agreement. Therefore, the TBT Agreement would
apply to a standard for vehicle air pollution equipment, but
34. See TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.
35. The definition also includes the phrase "or their related processes and
production methods." TBT Agreement, supra note 6, annex 1.1. These addi-
tional terms modify the plural word "characteristics," and this language has
historically been limited to process and production methods that affect product
characteristics only.
36. Id.
1995]
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not a standard for air pollution from stationary facilities
within the U.S. Therefore, most provisions of the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA") would not be affected.
The TBT Agreement permits governments to adopt envi-
ronmental health and safety measures based on protection
levels they deem appropriate. In the preamble to the TBT
Agreement, members expressly recognize:
No country should be prevented from taking measures...
for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or
health, or the environment... at levels it considers appro-
priate... [provided] that the measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination .... 37
Article 2.2 expressly recognizes protection of human
health or safety, animal or plant life or health as a legitimate
objective of technical standards. Thus, under the TBT Agree-
ment, governments are free to adopt measures based on the
protection levels they deem appropriate.
Despite these provisions, critics of the URA contend that
the TBT Agreement will subject a host of U.S. environmental
laws to challenge as being inconsistent with the TBT Agree-
ment and will require the U.S. to harmonize its standards
with less stringent international standards. As discussed be-
low, these concerns are not justified.
A. Trade Restrictiveness Test
The TBT Agreement requires that governments ensure
that "technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or ap-
plied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade."31
Article 2.2 does not contain a footnote similar to footnote
2 in the S & P Agreement defining "unnecessary." However,
according to a December 15, 1993 letter from the Director
General of GATT to the Chief U.S. Negotiator, the require-
ments of this provision are the same as Article 5(6) of the S &
P Agreement. The provision requires a challenging govern-
ment to show that another measure: (1) is reasonably avail-
37. TBT Agreement, supra note 6, Preamble.
38. TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.2.
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able to the member; (2) fulfills the legitimate objectives of the
member; and (3) is significantly less restrictive to trade.
As discussed above, the criteria place a heavy burden on
a government seeking to challenge a technical standard. The
alternative standard must be at least as protective and sig-
nificantly less restrictive to trade.
B. Use of International Standards Not Required
The TBT Agreement, like the S & P Agreement, encour-
ages use of international standards where appropriate. Arti-
cle 2.4 directs members to use international standards:
as a basis for their technical regulations except when such
international standards or relevant parts would be an in-
effective or inappropriate means for fulfillment of the legit-
imate objectives pursued, for instance, because of funda-
mental climactic or geographic factors or fundamental
technical problems.
39
Because protection of the environment is a "legitimate
objective" under the TBT Agreement, 40 environmental protec-
tion provides a basis for deviating from international
standards.
As discussed above in Section III, the preamble also con-
firms the intent of the members to leave governments free to
select the level of protection they deem appropriate to fulfill a
legitimate objective.
Some have argued that the two examples listed as rea-
sons to depart from an international standard-fundamental
climactic or geographical factors and fundamental technologi-
cal problems-are unreasonably narrow. However, the term
"for instance" makes it clear that these are not limitations
but are given by way of example only; therefore, they are not
the only bases for departing from international standards.
Moreover, other provisions of the URA make it clear that en-
vironmental protection is a factor comparable to fundamental
climactic or geographical factors and fundamental technical
factors. 4 ' In addition, the TBT Agreement merely directs
members to use international standards "as a basis" for a
39. TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.4 (emphasis supplied).
40. TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.2.
41. See TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5.4; annex 3.F (both listing envi-
ronmental protection along with fundamental climactic or geographical factors
and fundamental technical factors).
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technical measure. Such standards need not be the only ba-
sis for the technical measure.
Thus, the TBT Agreement does not impair the ability of
the U.S., state or local governments to adopt stringent techni-
cal measures, even if more stringent than international stan-
dards, unless those measures constitute a disguised restric-
tion on trade.
C. Equivalent Technical Regulations
Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement provides:
Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as
equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if
these regulations differ from their own, provided that they
are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfill the
objectives of their own regulations.42
Critics contend that this provision could impair the abil-
ity of the U.S. to reject imports that do not comply with U.S.
technical standards. Similar to the provision in the S & P
Agreement, Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement makes it clear
that, although governments are encouraged to accept the
technical standards of other countries as equivalent, a coun-
try is free to reject foreign regulations if it deems that the
regulations do not adequately fulfill the objectives of its own
regulations. The regulations include those with objectives of
environmental protection, human health, safety, or animal or
plant life or health. Therefore, Article 2.7 does not impair a
government's ability to reject goods from another country
based on differing standards.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Another important change between GATT and the WTO
that could impact environmental health and safety provisions
is the development of improved dispute resolution proce-
dures. While maintaining the traditional emphasis on nego-
tiated resolution of international disputes, the DSU provides
for a more rule-based resolution of disputes that cannot be
resolved through negotiation.
The post-Uruguay Round system of dispute resolution
shares several essential features with the GATT. Under Arti-
cle 15 of the DSU, the preparation of panel reports is essen-
42. TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.7.
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tially the same as under the existing GATT system. The
panel submits the descriptive part of its report to the disput-
ing parties for comment in writing. Once those comments
have been received, the panel issues an interim report which
contains a descriptive section as well as the findings and con-
clusions of the panel. The parties then have further opportu-
nity to comment on the interim report. Upon the conclusion of
this second comment period, the interim report is amended to
include a response to the arguments of the parties and be-
comes a final report that is circulated to the members.
Despite its similarities to the existing dispute resolution
system, the DSU contains a number of distinct, new features.
For example, the DSU provides greater transparency for dis-
pute resolution by authorizing members to publish their own
submissions and by requiring a party to produce a summary
of its panel submissions on request. Another important im-
provement is the establishment of a process for appeal to a
standing appellate body. This appellate process will help to
ensure that the covered agreements are not misinterpreted
by a panel.
The DSU also integrates the dispute resolution process
by establishing a single body, the Dispute Resolution Body
("DRB"), to implement the dispute resolution procedures
under the post-Uruguay Round GATT system. The DRB will
have authority to establish panels, adopt panel and appellate
body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rul-
ings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of con-
cessions and other obligations under the covered agree-
ments.a3 Under GATT, each agreement involved a separate
process for dispute resolution.
Another change is that the DSU seeks to ensure timely
completion of the dispute settlement process and a reliable
means of enforcement of panel reports. Deadlines and proce-
dures outlined in the DSU ensure that a challenged party
cannot pursue procedural mechanisms to block the process.
For example, adoption of panel reports will become auto-
matic, no longer subject to the rule of consensus. In fact, the
DSU provides that all panel reports will be adopted unless a
consensus of members opposes adoption; for example, all par-
ties agree not to support adoption. The practical effect will be
43. DSU, supra note 7, art. 2.1.
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that all panel reports will be adopted. After passage of a pre-
scribed period during which an offending country fails to com-
ply with a panel report, the injured party would be able to
compensate itself through retaliation, unless the DRB mem-
bers were to oppose such compensation by consensus. Like
disputes under GATT, nothing in the URA authorizes the
WTO or a panel to require a party to pay compensation to
another member. Members are free, however, to negotiate
voluntary payments for violations of the URA.
While the DSU creates a more integrated system of dis-
pute resolution that is intended to streamline the dispute res-
olution process, Article 19.2 of the DSU limits the judicial na-
ture of panels and of the new "appellate body" by making
their decisions susceptible to challenge when they add to or
diminish the rights of members. In this respect, the dispute
resolution process in the post-Uruguay GATT process shares
the essential features of the existing GATT process. For ex-
ample, Article 3.9 of the DSU states: "The provisions of this
Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Mem-
bers to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a
covered agreement through decision making under the (WTO
agreement) or a covered Agreement." Thus, the ultimate de-
cision-making power in the post-Uruguay system still resides
with the General Council, which in the context of dispute res-
olution makes it decisions by consensus. 44
Critics of the DSU contend that the dispute resolution
provisions are overly secretive, that panel decisions will in-
fringe upon the sovereignty of the U.S., and that panels will
not have adequate expertise in environmental issues. Each
of these concerns is discussed below.
A. Transparency
As discussed above, the DSU greatly improves public ac-
cess to information in the dispute settlement process. Parties
to a dispute must provide to the public either their panel sub-
missions or non-confidential summaries of their panel sub-
missions. The DSU also expressly permits parties to provide
their own panel submissions to the public at any time. In ad-
dition, the implementing legislation passed by the U.S. Con-
gress helps to ensure that the public will have ample opportu-
44. DSU, supra note 7, art. 2.4.
1160 [Vol. 35
1161NAFTA-GATT SYMPOSIUM
nity to participate in panel disputes. For example, the U.S.
legislation established a special commission comprising
members of the public, environmental groups, and industry,
to assist the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") on trade
and environment issues.45
Pointing to the emphasis on public participation in dis-
pute resolution in the U.S., critics assert that the dispute set-
tlement process ought to provide for additional transparency
and public participation. These objections, however, are
based upon a misperception of the international dispute reso-
lution process, which is more appropriately analyzed as high-
level diplomatic negotiations than as a trial in a common-law
court.4 6
One of the overriding interests in dispute resolution pro-
cedures in international trade as well as international envi-
ronmental agreements is to foster confidential negotiations
between the parties, making demands for full public partici-
pation inappropriate. The DSU strongly emphasizes consen-
sus and private consultations, placing a higher value on col-
laborative effort and confidentiality than on the speed of the
resolution and public participation. 47 The emphasis results
in part because there is no international marshal to enforce a
judicial determination. Therefore, negotiated solutions are
more likely to be carried out.
The emphasis on negotiated settlements in the DSU is
consistent with other international agreements. For exam-
ple, the Charter of the United Nations lists a set of peaceful
techniques for dispute settlement, to be applied by member
states:
The parties to any dispute .. .shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
45. See H.R. 5110 Sec. 128 (Pub. L. 103-465) (1994).
46. The debate over transparency is really a dispute over process rather
than a dispute over a direct impact of the URA on U.S. and state environmental
laws. However, the concern regarding transparency has been a central tenet of
environmental groups' arguments against the URA. It therefore appears ap-
propriate to discuss the issue in the context of the impact of the URA on U.S.
environmental laws.
47. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 4 (relating to consultation), art. 5 (relating
to Good Offices, conciliation and mediation), art. 7 (mutually acceptable solu-
tion "is clearly to be preferred"), art. 11 ("Panels should consult regularly with
the parties to the dispute and given them adequate opportunity to develop a
mutually satisfactory solution"), art. 22.2 (regarding negotiation for voluntary
compensation).
19951
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agen-
cies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.48
Numerous other agreements utilize this scaled resolu-
tion process which emphasizes negotiation and consultation
rather than confrontation, including GATT, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the 1992 Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the 1992 Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, the 1991 Protocol on Environment Protec-
tion of the Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, and the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Ozone Layer.
These agreements show clearly that diplomacy plays a
critical role in resolving disputes. Nonetheless, it is likely
that the dispute resolution process will continue to evolve,
leading to increased public participation in resolving trade
and environment disputes. This trend is clear both from the
improved transparency provisions included in the DSU and
from the creation of the Trade and Environment Commission
established by the URA.
B. Sovereignty
Critics of the URA claim that the WTO will diminish
U.S. sovereignty by expanding the power and reach of the dis-
pute resolution process. 49 This concern arises because the
U.S. will no longer be able to unilaterally block the adoption
of decisions that it does not like.
48. U.N. Charter Article 33.
49. A few critics also claim that the U.S. is ceding sovereignty by permitting
decisions of the WTO to be made by less than full consensus. However, because
all legislative decisions of the WTO are made by consensus, the U.S. will have
the ability to veto decisions that are not acceptable. See WTO Agreement,
supra note 11, art. IX. While some decisions (such as temporary waiver of spe-
cific requirements of the URA) may be made by a two-thirds or three-fourths
majority, those decisions do not impact important provisions of the URA. In
other instances where less than a consensus is required, only members support-
ing those housekeeping measures are bound by them. See id. at 3. Moreover, it
is highly unlikely that a two-thirds or three-fourths majority could be reached if
the U.S. opposed the measure. In any event, it is fully anticipated that the
WTO will continue to operate by consensus. Another "sovereignty" argument
made by critics is that the U.S. will be required to conform its laws with the
obligations imposed by the URA. However, this obligation simply reflects the
basic requirement that governments abide by the obligations to which they
have agreed. In fact, the Tokyo Round Agreements, approved by Congress in
1979, contain even stronger conformity language than the URA does.
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First, it is axiomatic that a country relinquishes at least
some measure of sovereignty upon entering into an interna-
tional agreement. Therefore, the critical question is not
whether the U.S. is relinquishing any sovereignty (for it that
were the test, the U.S. would never enter into international
agreements), but whether the U.S. is inappropriately relin-
quishing sovereignty. A careful examination of the DSU
shows that the relinquishment of sovereignty is minimal. In
fact, the sovereignty of the U.S. will be enhanced by the im-
proved dispute resolution procedures because the U.S. will be
able to enforce its legal rights more effectively. In any event,
the U.S. retains its right to withdraw from the WTO at any
time, and in fact, the implementing legislation established a
special panel to evaluate at the end of three years whether
the U.S. should withdraw from the WTO.
5°
While the U.S. will no longer be able to unilaterally block
panel decisions, use of this authority under GATT by the U.S.
has been minimal. More importantly, the effect of the panel
decisions on U.S. law is the same under the URA as it was
under GATT. Nothing in the DSU provides the dispute set-
tlement panel with authority to repeal U.S. laws or otherwise
require the U.S. to take specific steps to come into compliance
with its obligations under the URA. If a panel decided that a
U.S. regulation violated the URA, the U.S. would have the
right to appeal the legal conclusions of the panel to a stand-
ing appellate committee. If the U.S. lost the appeal, it would
be up to the U.S. to decide how to respond. Options would
include changing the federal legislation, disregarding the
panel decision and allowing sanctions to be imposed, negoti-
ating a settlement with the other party or taking some other
action. While another member could impose trade sanctions
as a last resort in the event the U.S. elected not to change its
laws, the same political and economic pressure also exists
under the current GATT regime. For example, the U.S. has
adopted unilateral trade sanctions against other GATT mem-
bers in several instances during the past ten years alone.
Therefore, in real terms, concern over the loss of sovereignty
to dispute resolution panels should be minimal because the
dispute resolution panels under the WTO will have no
50. See H.R. 5110 sec. 128 (Pub.L. 103-465)(1994).
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greater authority than they do under the current GATT
regime.
C. Environmental Expertise
Critics contend that the panels do not have adequate ex-
pertise to deal with environmental and public health or
safety issues. However, the DSU establishes procedures for
panels to seek advice and to form expert review groups to ad-
vise them on scientific or other technical issues of fact.5 1 The
DSU expressly states that parties to a dispute may request
that the panel utilize such a review group. 2 Moreover, in
disputes involving the U.S., the panelists will be advised by
the USTR, who will be assisted by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA"), the general public and a new private
sector advisory committee created to assist the trade office
with trade and environment issues.
V. USE OF TRADE MEASURES TO FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL
OBJECTIVES
One issue that is not expressly addressed in the URA is
the use of trade measures to further environmental protec-
tion objectives. Such measures are taken either multilater-
ally through a multilateral environmental agreement
("MEA") or unilaterally through domestic initiatives. MEAs
are directed at protecting the global commons, such as the
atmosphere, wildlife or the oceans, while domestic measures
are directed at either protecting the global commons or pro-
tecting domestic industry from perceived unfair competition
that results from the lower environmental compliance costs of
foreign producers.
A. Trade Measures in MEAs
Several MEAs utilize trade measures that are directed at
protecting the global commons.53 For example, the Montreal
51. DSU, supra note 7, art. 13.
52. Id.
53. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/
130 7 (1992); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,
1985, S. Treaty Doc. no. 9, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (1985); Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,
Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG. 80/3 (1989); Convention of International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 93
U.N.T.S. 243 (1976).
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Protocol bans the importation of some goods made in a man-
ner that harms the ozone, even if the product itself does not
contain an ozone-depleting substance. The banning of a prod-
uct based upon its process of production would normally vio-
late the GATT principle, carried forward in the URA, that a
government cannot distinguish between two like products.
For example, two computers could be exactly the same except
that one computer was manufactured in a manner that emits
ozone-depleting substances into the atmosphere. Under the
URA, these products should not be treated differently. How-
ever, under the Montreal Protocol, a government is author-
ized to ban the importation of the computer if it is made in a
manner that harms the ozone.
Neither the GATT nor the URA contains an exception for
trade measures adopted pursuant to MEAs. While no coun-
try has yet challenged the MEA trade measures under GATT,
the GATT Secretariat has indicated that, at least under
GATT, such MEAs would not violate GATT due to the exemp-
tion for trade restrictions "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health."54
Similarly, it is likely that MEAs will be deemed not to
conflict with the URA. Both the S & P Agreement and the
TBT Agreement contain provisions similar to GATT Article
XX(B). 55 In fact, the URA recognizes protection of the envi-
ronment and sustainable development as objectives of the
parties in entering the agreements:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living... while allowing for the opti-
mal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to pro-
tect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their re-
spective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development .... "
Moreover, Article 3.5 of the DSU provides that dispute
settlement "shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to
any capitalized member under the [URA and associated
54. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
55. See S & P Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11; TBT Agreement, supra note
6, art. 2.2.
56. WTO Agreement, supra note 11, Preamble (emphasis supplied).
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agreements], nor impede the attainment of any objective of
those agreements." Thus, because environmental protection
is an objective of the parties in entering the URA, it would
seem likely that the URA should not be interpreted in a man-
ner that impairs the objective of Members to pursue environ-
mental protection or sustainable development, especially
where those measures are the result of a multilateral
agreement.
B. Unilateral Measures to Protect the Global Commons
While trade measures taken pursuant to an MEA would
not violate the URA, it is possible that unilateral measures
taken to protect the global commons or to protect domestic
industry from perceived competitive disadvantages created
by the higher cost of environmental compliance in the U.S.
could be subject to challenge. Although the URA does not dis-
tinguish between unilateral measures and multilateral
agreements, previous GATT panels put into question the
right of governments to adopt unilateral measures that regu-
late process methods outside the jurisdiction of the adopting
country.
The most well-known example of this type of unilateral
measure is the U.S. import ban on tuna caught in a manner
that harms dolphins. Under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, the U.S. bans tuna not only from countries that catch
tuna in a manner unacceptable to the U.S. (even if in full
compliance with international law and the law of the flag-
ship), but also from countries that import tuna from a coun-
try that uses the objectionable fishing method. Two GATT
panels have determined that the U.S. tuna ban violates
GATT, but neither panel decision has been adopted.5 v The
more recent tuna/dolphin panel decision emphasized the uni-
lateral nature of the U.S. action. Because nothing in the
57. The panel decision involving Mexico was resolved through negotiations.
In response to the GATT decision, the U.S. Congress passed the International
Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992. The Act provides for the Secretary of State
to enter into international agreements to establish a global moratorium on har-
vesting tuna through the use of seine nets deployed to encircle dolphins. Inter-
national Dolphin Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.S. 1361 (1995). Mexico entered
into such agreements, and it now allows U.S. observers on tuna boats to moni-
tor the dolphin capture and uses dolphin-safe measures to harvest tuna. How-
ever, an estimated 30,000 Mexican fishermen will lose their jobs because of this
compromise.
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URA authorizes a government to unilaterally impose its own
environmental measures on another country by requiring im-
ports to be processed in a certain manner, it is possible that
such unilateral measures would violate the URA. If use of
the product has an adverse environmental impact on the
U.S., then the measure may be justified under the TBT
Agreement. However, unilateral measures based upon envi-
ronmental impacts outside the adopting country will likely
violate the URA.
While many environmentalists in the U.S. find the re-
striction on unilateral environmental measures completely
unacceptable, it is important to keep in mind that the U.S.
practically stands alone in its insistence on using unilateral
trade measures for the purpose of protecting the global com-
mons or protecting domestic industry from lower environ-
mental compliance costs of foreign competition. Almost every
other country believes that it is more appropriate to proceed
on a multilateral basis. In fact, during the period of the Uru-
guay Round negotiations, seven global environmental agree-
ments were reached. If the URA authorized unilateral meas-
ures, the incentive for the U.S. to enter such multilateral
negotiations could decrease.
Many in the U.S. believe that the U.S. is the leader in
global environmental protection and that the U.S. should
therefore be entitled to take unilateral action to protect the
global commons, including measures that would require com-
panies operating outside the U.S. to comply with U.S. stan-
dards. Implicit in this position is the notion that the U.S.
should act as the unelected international environmental po-
lice and the moral guardian for the less developed nations.
People in less developed nations characterize the U.S. posi-
tion as eco-colonialism, perpetrating the cycle of debt and
poverty in less developed nations, or at a minimum, anti-
democratic. Ironically, environmentalists also decry the URA
as anti-democratic.
Some take the position that the U.S. should be able to
dictate the standards of production in another country, how-
ever, such authority would appear to infringe upon the sover-
eign right of each country to regulate activities within its own
borders. Moreover, unilateral measures are often completely
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ineffective,58 and where those measures have the effect of
protecting domestic industries, it is likely that they will be
overused.
While these political and philosophical problems are
profound, the practical hurdles pose the biggest problems for
advocates of unilateral environmental measures. For exam-
ple, the U.S. controls pollution in large part by setting dis-
charge limitations or by requiring certain types of pollution
control equipment; the type of discharge permitted or the
type of equipment required, however, varies with the age and
technical sophistication of the facility, the type of industry
and the ambient conditions around the facility.5 9 Moreover,
many environmental laws set long-term compliance sched-
ules intended to facilitate or to ease the burdens of complying
with the standards.6 0 Depending on a variety of cultural and
budgetary factors, governments vary their emphasis on en-
forcement. Determining whether the standards are imposed
by another government are equivalent to this multi-faceted
approach to controlling pollution is an impossible task.
Additional problems associated with unilateral process-
of-production standards exist. First, requiring immediate
compliance with U.S. pollution control technology would be
overwhelmingly disruptive at best, impossible at worst, in de-
veloping countries. Moreover, imposing stringent U.S. emis-
sion standards on a developing country may divert resources
away from more basic environmental needs, such as waste-
water treatment plants or hazardous waste disposal facili-
ties. Second, many standards are based on ambient condi-
tions, which may not be present in other countries or
geographical locations. For example, restrictions imposed in
the Los Angeles air basin would not be appropriate for a facil-
ity operating on an island where air quality problems are
58. For example, increasing tariffs may cause another government to lower
environmental standards to enable domestic industry to compete. Alterna-
tively, a country may simply sell its goods somewhere else.
59. For example, the Clean Water Act requires that industrial facilities
meet four different standards, depending on the age of the facility and the na-
ture of the pollutants involved. The first standard became effective July 1,
1977; the second, July 1, 1984; the third, between 1984 and 1989; and the
fourth applied a new set of standards to new facilities and to specific modifica-
tions of existing facilities. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
60. Under the Clean Air Act amendment of 1990, compliance schedules are
stretched out for as long as 20 years, and it is possible that even these deadlines
will be extended. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.S. 6921 (1990).
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nonexistent. Third, assumptions regarding environmental
impacts are not appropriately applied in different geographic
locations. For example, to limit the emission of greenhouse
gasses, a country may differentiate between products based
upon the quantity of energy consumed in making them. This
distinction would be completely inappropriate in comparing a
product made in a coal-burning country (extensive green-
house emissions) with a product made in a country using only
hydropower (zero greenhouse emissions). Further, U.S. com-
panies operate with the burden of joint and several liability
for cleaning up past contamination based on mere property
ownership, a policy decision based on political choice rather
than one requiring internalization of pollution costs. Impos-
ing this political choice on other countries would be impracti-
cal and difficult to enforce.
Thus, there exist a whole host of problems associated
with imposing U.S. production methods on facilities operat-
ing outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. These problems are
likely to be among the issues addressed by the trade and en-
vironment working group established by the URA and are
most appropriately addressed through multilateral
negotiations.
While the URA appears to restrict the ability of the U.S.
to adopt unilateral measures directed at protecting the global
commons, the impact of this restriction on current U.S. laws
will be minimal. As a practical matter, very few current U.S.
regulations address the process of production in foreign
countries.
In any event, the U.S. remains free to adopt and enforce
such unilateral trade measures based on the process of pro-
duction in other countries, provided that it is willing to accept
the consequences, such as, the potential for trade sanctions.
Therefore, if protecting the global commons is an important
value to the U.S., the U.S. may seek that policy objective
through unilateral means. If that measure injures another
country, then it should be the U.S. that pays the cost of its
own policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of the URA on U.S. environmental laws and
regulations will be minimal. The S & P Agreement and the
TBT Agreement allow governments to adopt environmental,
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health and safety regulations based upon whatever risk level
they deem appropriate. The URA will not require the U.S. to
lower its standards to international levels, except where the
U.S. finds the risk level of the international standards accept-
able. Although the URA imposes certain restrictions on S &
P and technical measures, such as requiring that S & P meas-
ures be based on scientific principles, that measures be no
more trade-restrictive than necessary, and that measures not
be disguised protectionist measures, these are criteria that
will not pose a problem for legitimate U.S. state and local
regulations.
Criticism regarding the new dispute resolution proce-
dure is also unjustified, especially because the DSU provides
for greater transparency and a greater emphasis on the rule
of law. As with other international dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, the primary focus remains on negotiation and consen-
sus-building.
Lastly, while the URA may not authorize unilateral
trade measures aimed at imposing U.S. process standards on
facilities in other countries, very few U.S. laws will be af-
fected by that restriction, and the U.S. is still free to seek to
address those problems through MEAs.
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